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Impulsivity, which is linked to a wide range of psychiatric disorders, is often characterized
by a preference for immediate but smaller rewards over delayed but larger rewards.
However, debate exists on the relationship between anxiety and impulsivity. Here
we use event-related potential (ERP) components as biomarkers in the temporal
discounting task to examine the effect of anxiety on inter-temporal decision-making.
Our behavioral results indicated that the high trait anxiety (HTA) group made significantly
more immediate choices than the low trait anxiety (LTA) group. Compared with the
LTA group, shorter response time was associated with immediate rewards in the HTA
group. Furthermore, previous studies have demonstrated three ERP components that
are associated with impulsivity and/or delay discounting. First, the N1 is an early sensory
component involved in selective attention and attention processing for goal-directed
actions. Second, the reward positivity (RewP) reflects reward-related dopaminergic
activity and encodes reward values. Third, the P3 is regarded as a measure of
motivational significance in the decision-making literature. Accordingly, this study found
in the immediate-option-evoked ERPs that the HTA group had a larger N1 than the LTA
group did. For the delayed-option-evoked ERPs, the HTA group had larger N1 and RewP
for the immediate choice than the LTA group did, while the LTA group had a larger P3 for
the delayed choice than the HTA group did. These results support the notion that anxiety
individuals are impulsive decision-makers in the Delay Discounting Task.
Keywords: temporal discounting, anxiety, impulsivity, decision-making, event-related potential
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety, an unpleasant emotional state that often directs an individual’s response to threat-related
information, plays a significant role in our everyday life (Clark, 1999). Anxiety interrupts daily
functions such as attention, workingmemory, and social skills, resulting in behavioral and cognitive
biases (Bishop, 2007). Exploring the cognitive and emotional components associated with anxiety is
beneficial for both clinical and non-clinical studies (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). This study focuses
on the relationship between anxiety and impulsive behavior (i.e., a range of non-rational tendencies
such as difficulties in inhibiting voluntary responses, deficits in delaying gratification, and a low
threshold for response). The extreme forms of impulsive behavior include aggressive or delinquent
behaviors, substance dependence, and suicide attempts (Askénazy et al., 2003).
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Previous research on the relationship between anxiety and
impulsive behavior has resulted in mixed findings. One the
one hand, anxiety and impulsivity have been traditionally
considered to be orthogonally or inversely related (Barratt,
1965). Most notably, the reinforcement sensitivity theory
proposed by Gray (1970, 1987) suggests that anxiety and
impulsivity are two independent biologically based dimensions
of personality, corresponding to avoidance and approach
motivations, respectively (see also in Caci et al., 1998; Corr, 2002).
Researchers have also pointed out that the characteristic features
of anxiety such as behavioral inhibition and safety-seeking may
be inconsistent with impulsivity (Taylor et al., 2008). On the
other hand, it has been found that impulsive behavior could be
caused by increased arousal and reduced cognitive efficiency (Del
Carlo et al., 2012). Consistent with this idea, many studies have
reported a link between anxiety and impulsivity (Jakuszkowiak-
Wojten et al., 2015). For instance, Taylor et al. (2008) found that
patients with a comorbid anxiety disorder showed higher levels
of impulsivity compared to patients without an anxiety disorder
(see also in Perugi et al., 2011; Del Carlo et al., 2012). To sum up,
as pointed out by Askénazy et al. (2003), the relationship between
anxiety and impulsivity is still highly controversial. In our
opinion, it is largely because of the two conflicting characteristics
of anxiety, i.e., an elevated level of physiological arousal (which
may lead to approach behavior) and an excessive focus on
threat-related stimuli (which may lead to avoidance behavior).
Therefore, to investigate the relationship between anxiety and
impulsivity could help understand the predominant motivation
of anxious individuals and further unravel the psychological
mechanisms of anxiety.
A potential reason for the heterogeneous findings in the
literature is that most studies rely on self-report measures;
however the validity of this method is limited by response
bias, socially desirable responses, and participants’ ability to
provide accurate information (Fowles, 1987; Crowley et al.,
2009). Regarding that, this study applies an experimental
paradigm of delay discounting, which is widely considered as
a behavioral performance measurement of impulsivity (Madden
and Bickel, 2010). Delay discounting (also known as temporal
discounting or time discounting) refers to a psychological
phenomenon that outcomes decrease in value as a function of
delay (Reynolds, 2006). During intertemporal decision-making,
the delay discounting effect may manifest as a preference for
the sooner but smaller monetary rewards over the larger delayed
rewards (McClure et al., 2004). The results from the delay
discounting paradigm have been interpreted to reflect impulsivity
(Crean et al., 2000). To our knowledge, Rounds et al. (2007)
first discovered that participants with high social anxiety showed
a larger effect of delay discounting (but see Jenks and Lawyer,
2015). This finding was then extended by Zhao et al. (2015),
who found that the relationship between anxiety and impulsive
choices is not specific to social anxiety.
The current study aims to investigate the neural underpinning
of delay discounting in anxiety, so as to enrich the understanding
of the relationship between anxiety and impulsivity.We chose the
event-related potential (ERP) technique for its exquisite temporal
resolution (Amodio et al., 2014). Three ERP components have
been associated with impulsivity and/or delay discounting, and
based on which we compared the ERP differences between
individuals with high and low trait anxiety (HTA and LTA). The
first component is the N1, which is an early sensory component
involved in selective attention and attention processing for goal-
directed actions (Schupp et al., 2007; Baldauf and Deubel, 2009).
Impulsive individuals have a larger N1 in response to visual
stimuli, indicating enhanced attentional orienting compared to
less impulsive individuals (Houston and Stanford, 2001). The
second component is the reward positivity (RewP), which is
traditionally known as the feedback error-related negativity and
has been considered as a negative-going component (Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). However,
recent studies have revealed that it actually reflects reward-
related dopaminergic activity and should be re-interpreted as a
larger positivity in the positive feedback condition rather than
a negative component in the negative feedback condition (Foti
et al., 2011; Walsh and Anderson, 2012; Proudfit, 2015). In
the delay discounting task, Cherniawsky and Holroyd (2013)
found that a larger RewP elicited by immediate compared to
delayed rewards indicates a stronger preference for impulsive
choices (Onoda et al., 2010; Mason et al., 2012). In addition, the
RewP might also reflect individual differences in intolerance of
uncertainty, since this component is sensitive to the uncertainty
of an outcome feedback (Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2008; Nelson et al.,
2016). Finally, the P3 is regarded as a measure of motivational
significance in the decision-making literature, i.e., reflecting the
potential impact of an outcome feedback on levels of motivation
(Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Wu and
Zhou, 2009). An enhanced P3 has been found in individuals
who show a larger delay discounting effect, which may indicate
stronger motivations to pursue immediate over delayed rewards
(Li et al., 2012). Both the RewP and the P3 are the most important
indexes of feedback processing during decision-making (San
Martín, 2012).
Given previous research about delay discounting in anxiety,
as well as characteristics of the ERP components described
above, we predicted that: (1) on the behavioral level, the HTA
group would exhibit an immediacy bias for rewards, indicating
higher levels of impulsivity compared to the LTA group; (2)
accordingly on the electrophysiological level, the LTA group
would show larger N1 (reflecting a higher selective attention),
RewP (reflecting a higher level of reward evaluation), and P3
amplitudes (reflecting a stronger motivation) for immediate
choices, compared to the LTA group. In contrast, the HTA group
would show higher P3 amplitudes for delayed choices. These
findings would provide valuable knowledge about the underlying
mechanism of the delay discounting bias in anxious people.
METHODS
Participants
In view of the fact that anxiety and depressive symptoms are
highly comorbid (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Hirsh and Inzlicht,
2008; Nelson et al., 2016) and depressive patients were also
impulsive in the delay discounting task (Wu and Zhou, 2009), we
only recruited non-depressed participants with high trait anxiety
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(HTA) and non-depressed participants with low trait anxiety in
this study.
All the freshman students (n = 6725) in Shenzhen University
were required to complete the Trait form of Spielberger’s State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983; Shek,
1993). In this sample, individuals with STAI-T scores in the upper
and lower 25% of the distribution were considered as HTA and
LTA subjects, respectively (Gu et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2014). The
Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck et al.,
1996) was used to assess self-reported symptoms of depression.
Only the participants with BDI-II scores<13 were considered in
this study (Note: while BDI-II<13 indicates minimal depression,
BDI-II ≥ 14 indicates mild, moderate, or severe depression;
see Beck et al., 1996). From those who met these criteria, we
randomly recruited 52 students as paid participants (26 in LTA
group and 26 inHTA group1). There was no significant difference
between the two groups with respect to age, handedness and
BDI-II scores (Table 1).
Exclusion criteria for both groups were (1) any Axis I and
II disorders according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994); (2) seizure disorder; (3) history of head
injury with possible neurological sequela, and (4) substance
abuse or dependence in the past 6 months. These criteria were
also designed to exclude the potential influence of psychiatric
medications on the results (Onoda et al., 2010; Mason et al., 2012;
Weisz et al., 2012; Needham et al., 2015).
Written informed consent was obtained prior to the
experiment. The experimental protocol was approved
by the Ethics Committee of Institute of Psychology,
Chinese Academy of Sciences (H14019) and this study
was performed strictly in accordance with the approved
guidelines.
Procedures
The experiment consisted of 480 trials. As shown in Figure 1, the
“Proposal 1” was first displayed for 800ms, with an earlier reward
(today or 2 weeks later). Then the “Proposal 2” was displayed
for 800 ms, with a delayed reward (2 weeks or a month later).
Finally, the two proposals were presented simultaneously (the
left and right sides of the two proposals were counterbalanced
across trials) and subject was required to press the choice button
as quickly as possible. There were three possible combinations
of time delay in two proposals, i.e., “today” in Proposal 1 vs.
“2 weeks later” in Proposal 2 (33.3%), “today” in Proposal 1 vs.
“a month later” in Proposal 2 (33.3%), and “2 weeks later” in
Proposal 1 vs. “a month later” in Proposal 2 (33.3%).
In each trial, participants were required to select from two
options: one was with a shorter delay but a smaller reward
(Proposal 1), and the other was with a longer delay but a larger
reward (Proposal 2). The amount of money in “Proposal 1” was
randomly (50 vs. 50%) chosen from two uniform distributions
1The sample size of this study was decided based on our previous studies (Wu et al.,
2013; Xu et al., 2013), which also employed ERP method to examine decision-
making issues in college students with trait anxiety. Furthermore, because small
sample size undermines the reliability of results, scholars now recommend a large
sample size in neuroscience studies (Button et al., 2013). Thus a relatively large
sample size was used in this study.
TABLE 1 | Demographic data of HTA and LTA participants.
Characteristics LTA (n = 26) HTA (n = 26) Statistics
Mean age, y 19.4 (18–20) 19.7 (17–21) t(50) = −1.77, p = 0.083
Sex, male/female 13/13 13/13
Handedness, right/left 26/0 26/0
STAI-T 30.5 (20–43) 56.54 (51–70) t(50) = −15.13, p < 0.001
BDI-II 3.87(0–7) 4.96 (0–12) t(50) = −0.65, p = 0.185
STAI-T, the Trait form of Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck
Depression Inventory (Second Edition). Descriptive data are presented as mean (range).
([50, 80] and [100, 130]); the amount of money in “Proposal
2” was 10 and 50% (probability: 50 vs. 50%) higher than in
“Proposal 1.”
Before the experiment, participants were told about the
rules of the task and the meaning of the symbols. They
were encouraged to respond according to their risk preference.
Participants were also informed that they should consider
every trial equally important, since a random trial would be
selected at the end of the experiment and the chosen time
delay in that trial would be the real delay for their monetary
reward.
Behavioral Measures
In addition to reaction time, this study defined another
behavioral measure, namely “impulsivity ratio,” to index the
preference for impulsive decision-making in individuals.
We considered the selection of the immediate reward in
Proposal 1 (a proposal with a shorter delay but a smaller reward)
as an impulsive choice and the selection of the delayed reward in
Proposal 2 (a proposal with a longer delay but a larger reward) as
a non-impulsive choice. The tendency to choose the immediate
reward indicates a preference for impulsive decision-making in
intertemporal scenarios. This preference was measured as the
“impulsivity ratio,” by dividing the number of impulsive choices
(Proposal 1) by the total number of choices (Proposal 1 +
Proposal 2). It was unnecessary to calculate the “non-impulsivity
ratio,” because its value was equal to one minus the impulsivity
ratio in each condition.
EEG Recording and Analysis
Brain electrical activity was recorded referentially against left
mastoid and off-line re-referenced to the average of the
left and right mastoids, by a 64-channel amplifier with a
sampling frequency of 250 Hz (Brain Products, Gilching,
Germany). Electroencephalography (EEG) data were collected
with electrode impedances kept below 5 k. Ocular artifacts were
removed from EEGs using a regression procedure implemented
in NeuroScan software (Scan 4.3).
The recorded EEG data were filtered (0.01–30 Hz) and
segmented beginning 200 ms prior to the onset of “Proposal
1” and “Proposal 2.” This study did not analyze the ERP
epochs evoked by the presentation of “two proposals” (i.e., the
screen in which two proposals were presented simultaneously)
because participants may have already assigned values to
Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 prior to this time point (Lebreton
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the delay discounting paradigm in this study.
et al., 2009). All epochs were baseline-corrected with respect
to the mean voltage over the 200 ms preceding the onset of
stimulus, followed by averaging in association with experimental
conditions. Trials contaminated with large artifacts (peak-to-
peak deflection exceeded ± 100 µV) were excluded from the
averaging. As a result, 35 ± 16 trials and 24 ± 34 trials
were rejected in each subject for Proposal 1 and Proposal 2,
respectively. Trial numbers did not show significant difference
between experimental conditions.
This study focused on the ERPs elicited by the immediate
option (Proposal 1) and the delayed option (Proposal 2) in
the two groups. We analyzed the average amplitudes of the
three ERP components (N1, RewP and P3) across different sets
of electrodes according to grand-mean ERP topographies and
relevant literatures (Onoda et al., 2010; Blackburn et al., 2012;
Mason et al., 2012; Cherniawsky and Holroyd, 2013). The N1
was measured as the average amplitude occurring 170–210 ms
after the onset of proposal presentation at the electrode sites
of O1, O2, PO7, PO8, P7, and P8 (Mason et al., 2012). The
RewP was defined as the average amplitude occurring 250–350
ms after the onset of proposal presentation at the electrode sites
of Fz, FCz, FC1, FC2, Cz, C1, and C2 (Holroyd et al., 2008;
Mason et al., 2012). The P3 was defined as the average amplitude
occurring 300–450 ms after the onset of proposal presentation at
the electrode sites of Pz, P3, P4, CPz, CP3, and CP4 (Wu et al.,
2016).
Statistics
Descriptive data were presented as mean ± standard error. The
significance level was set at 0.05.
First, the behavioral measures (impulsivity ratio and response
time) were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA, with choice
(immediate vs. delayed choice) as the within-subject factor, and
group (HTA vs. LTA) as the between-subject factor.
Then the ERP components time-locked to the Proposal 1 and
Proposal 2 were analyzed separately. For the ERPs time-locked
to the Proposal 1, a two-way ANOVA was used, with time delay
(“today” and “2 weeks later”) as the within-subject factor, and
group as the between-subject factor. For the ERPs time-locked to
the Proposal 2, another two-way ANOVA was used, with choice
(immediate vs. delayed choice) as the within-subject factor, and
group as the between-subject factor.
Significant interactions were analyzed using simple effects
model. Post-hoc testing of significant main effects was conducted
using the Bonferroni method.
Finally, two-tailed Pearson’s r correlation was performed
between behavioral and ERP measurements. Correction for
multiple comparisons was based on Holm’s stepwise method.
RESULTS
In this section, we first report the behavioral results. Then the
ERP results of the three components were reported. Finally, the
correlation between behavioral and ERPmeasures were reported.
For the sake of brevity, the experimental effects that did not reach
significance were omitted.
Behaviors
This study analyzed two behavioral measures, i.e., impulsivity
ratio and response time.
Impulsivity Ratio
The main effect of group was significant [F(1, 50) = 4.75, p =
0.034, η2p = 0.087]. Compared with the LTA group (54.8± 3.4%),
the HTA group made more impulsive choices (65.3 ± 3.4%;
Figure 2A).
Response Time (RT)
The main effect of group was significant [F(1, 50) = 7.20, p =
0.010, η2p = 0.126]. The HTA group (572 ± 15.7 ms) responded
much faster than the LTA group did (632± 15.7ms).
The main effect of choice was significant [F(1, 50) = 5.97, p =
0.017, η2p = 0.107]. The response time for the immediate choice
(581± 13.6ms) was significantly shorter than that for the delayed
choice (624± 14.7 ms).
The interaction between choice and group was significant
[F(1, 50) = 4.07, p = 0.049, η
2
p = 0.075; Figure 2B]. Compared
with the LTA group (628 ± 19.2 ms), the HTA group responded
faster when the immediate option was chosen (533 ± 19.2 ms).
However, no significant difference was found between the two
groups when the delayed option was chosen [F(1, 50) < 1; LTA
= 636± 20.8 ms, HTA= 612± 20.8 ms].
ERPs
In this subsection, we first report the ERP results time-locked to
the Proposal 1. Then the ERP results time-locked to the Proposal
2 were reported. The three ERP components were presented in
a temporal sequence. For the sake of brevity, the experimental
effects that did not reach significance were omitted.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 January 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 5
Xia et al. Impulsive Decision-Making in Anxiety
ERP Components Evoked by the Immediate Option
(Proposal 1)
N1
The main effect of group was significant [F(1, 50) = 5.75,
p = 0.020, η2p = 0.103]. The HTA group had a larger N1 (−1.12
± 0.23 µV) compared with the LTA group (−0.36 ± 0.23 µV;
Figure 3).
P3
The main effect of group was marginally significant
[F(1, 50) = 4.03, p = 0.050, η
2
p = 0.075]; the HTA group
had a larger P3 (2.88± 0.18 µV) compared with LTA group (2.39
± 0.18 µV; Figure 4).
ERP Components Evoked by the Delayed Option
(Proposal 2)
N1
The main effect of choice was significant [F(1, 50) = 8.69,
p= 0.005, η2p = 0.148]; the immediate choice evoked significantly
larger N1 (−1.77 ± 0.23 µV) compared with the delayed choice
(−1.11± 0.20 µV).
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results. (A) The impulsivity ratio in the two groups; (B) The response time in the two groups between immediate and delayed choices. Bars
represent standard error of the mean. LTA, the low-trait anxiety group; HTA, the high-trait anxiety group. *p < 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | The N1 component time-locked to the immediate option (Proposal 1). ERPs were calculated by averaging the data at the electrodes of O1, O2,
PO7, PO8, P7, and P8.
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The interaction between choice and group was significant
[F(1, 50) = 5.64, p = 0.021, η
2
p = 0.101; Figure 5]. The
immediate choice evoked a larger N1 (−2.23 ± 0.33 µV)
in the HTA group than in the LTA group [−1.30± 0.33 µV;
marginally significant, F(1, 50) = 3.93, p = 0.053]. However,
no group difference was found for the delayed choice
[F(1, 50) < 1; LTA = −1.18 ± 0.28 µV, HTA = −1.04 ±
0.28µV].
FIGURE 4 | The P3 component time-locked to the immediate option (Proposal 1). ERPs were calculated by averaging the data at the electrodes of Pz, P3, P4,
CPz, CP3, and CP4.
FIGURE 5 | The N1 component time-locked to the delayed option (Proposal 2). ERPs were calculated by averaging the data at the electrodes of O1, O2, PO7,
PO8, P7, and P8.
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RewP
The main effect of choice was significant [F(1, 50) = 13.3,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.210]. The immediate choice evoked a larger
RewP (2.18 ± 0.29 µV) compared with the delayed choice did
(1.47± 0.26 µV).
The main effect of groups was significant [F(1, 50) = 4.90, p =
0.031, η2p = 0.089]. The HTA group had a larger RewP (2.40 ±
0.37 µV) compared with the LTA group (1.26± 0.37 µV).
The interaction between choice and group was significant
[F(1, 50) = 14.3, p< 0.001, η
2
p = 0.222; Figure 6]. The immediate
choice evoked a larger RewP (3.12± 0.41 µV) in the HTA group
than in the LTA group [1.24± 0.41µV; F(1, 50)= 10.6, p= 0.002].
However, no group difference was found for the delayed choice
[F(1, 50) < 1; LTA= 1.27± 0.37 µV, HTA= 1.68± 0.37 µV].
P3
The main effect of choice was significant [F(1, 50) = 14.1; p
< 0.001; η2p = 0.220]. The delayed choice evoked a larger P3
(2.85 ± 0.19 µV) compared with the immediate choice did
(2.25± 0.22µV).
The interaction between choice and group was significant
[F(1, 50) = 11.0; p = 0.002; η
2
p = 0.180; Figure 7]. The delayed
choice evoked a larger P3 (3.43± 0.27µV) in the LTA group than
in the HTA group [2.26 ± 0.27 µV; F(1, 50) = 9.57, p = 0.003].
However, no group difference was found for the immediate
choice [F(1, 50) < 1; LTA = 2.30 ± 0.31 µV, HTA = 2.19 ± 0.31
µV].
The Correlation between Behavioral and
ERPs
According to the ERP results reported above, we conducted
Pearson correlation analyses between the ERP measures (the
three indexes which showed interaction between choice and
group) and the RT (the only behavioral index which showed
interaction between choice and group).
For the N1 and RewP evoked by the delayed option (i.e., the
Proposal 2), we used the associated amplitudes in the condition
when the immediate choice was selected. For the P3 evoked by
the delayed option we used the amplitudes in the condition when
the delayed choice was selected. For the RT, we used the data in
the condition when the immediate choice was selected.
Totally three corrections were performed, resulting in two
significant correlations after correction formultiple comparisons.
The RewP (r = −0.37, p = 0.007, corrected p = 0.014) and
P3 (r = 0.385, p = 0.005, corrected p = 0.015) were correlated
significantly with the RT.
DISCUSSION
Debate exists on the relationship between trait anxiety and
impulsive behavior. This study applied the delay discounting
paradigm to compare the tendency of making impulsive choices
between HTA and LTA participants. On the behavioral level, the
HTA group chose the immediate option more often than the LTA
group regardless of its incentive value. Additionally, the speed
needed for choosing the immediate option was shorter in the
HTA group than in the LTA group, while this RT difference was
not significant when the delayed option was chosen.
According to the literature, we speculate that the delay
discounting effect in anxious individuals is driven by their
intolerance of uncertainty (IU;MacDonald et al., 2015). The term
IU describes negative beliefs about future-oriented uncertainty,
which is also a key feature of anxiety (Duronto et al., 2005;
Maner and Schmidt, 2006; Bensi and Giusberti, 2007; Grupe
and Nitschke, 2013). Patients diagnosed with anxiety disorder
FIGURE 6 | The RewP component time-locked to the delayed option (Proposal 2). ERPs were calculated by averaging the data at the electrodes of Fz, FCz,
FC1, FC2, Cz, C1, and C2.
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FIGURE 7 | The P3 component time-locked to the delayed option (Proposal 2). ERPs were calculated by averaging the data at the electrodes of Pz, P3, P4,
CPz, CP3, and CP4.
often show a higher IU score than the controls, possibly due to
insufficient perception of personal control (Krain et al., 2008).
Therefore, anxious individuals are more likely to underestimate
the value of delayed rewards. In the current study, both the
impulsivity ratio and the response time indicate that HTA
participants favored immediacy. We suggest these behavioral
results are consistent with previous findings that anxious
individuals display high level of IU (Krain et al., 2008). That is
to say, HTA participants avoided the delayed option because its
association with uncertainty elicits a feeling of worry. However,
a non-negligible limitation of the current study is that we did
not include any behavioral measure of the IU level, such as
the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Buhr and Dugas, 2002).
Follow-up research is necessary to address this issue directly.
On the electrophysiological level, three ERP components (N1,
RewP, and P3) evoked by both the immediate option (Proposal
1) and the delayed option (Proposal 2) were analyzed. Previous
literature suggest that during decision-making, the N1, RewP, and
P3 reflect the processes of attentional orientation, encoding of
reward value, and motivational evaluation, respectively (Polezzi
et al., 2010; Blackburn et al., 2012; San Martín, 2012). The
theoretical significance of the current ERP findings is interpreted
under this framework.
First, the increased N1 amplitudes have been associated with
high levels of impulsivity. For example, impulsive-aggressive
participants exhibited a larger N1 in response to visual stimuli,
indicating an enhanced attentional orientation (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002). In the current study, the N1 elicited by
the immediate option was enhanced in the HTA group than
in the LTA group, indicating that HTA participants paid more
attention to this option.When participants’ decisions (immediate
vs. delayed) was taken into account, a significant choice by
group interaction shows that the N1 became larger when HTA
participants made an immediate decision, which also indicates
more attentional resources being allocated. In our opinion, this
result could be regarded as evidences that early attentional
orientation contributes to anxious people’s impulsive choices.
As pointed out by Blackburn et al. (2012), impulsive decisions
might be initially driven by an attentional bias toward immediate
reward, which manifests as an enlarged N1 component.
Therefore, the N1 finding indicates that the relationship between
trait anxiety and impulsive choices is mediated by an attention
allocation strategy that prefers immediacy at the early stage
of option assessment. In line with our interpretation, previous
studies using clinical assessments have discovered a positive
correlation between trait anxiety symptoms and attentional
impulsivity score in patients with anxiety disorder (Summerfeldt
et al., 2004; Perugi et al., 2011).
Second, the RewP has been widely considered to represent
the encoding of reward values (Lukie et al., 2014; Proudfit,
2015). Consistent with this classical theory, both immediate and
delayed options evoked the RewP sensitive to the amount of
reward. Most importantly, the RewP elicited by the delayed
option showed a significant choice by group interaction, which
was similar with the N1 pattern. That is, the RewP was larger
when it was followed by an immediate decision in the HTA
group than in the LTA group, but this effect was absent for
the delayed decision. Seeing that the group difference selectively
appeared on the RewP elicited by the Proposal 2 (the delayed
option), we suggest that the RewP finding indicates that trait
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anxiety modulates the comparison of reward values between the
two options. In line with this hypothesis, previous studies have
reported that the RewP amplitude reflects the relative rather than
absolute values of ongoing events (Holroyd and Coles, 2008). In
our opinion, high levels of trait anxiety resulted in overestimation
of the reward value for immediate options compared to delayed
options; therefore the RewP was larger for the immediate choice
than the delayed choice in HTA participants. In addition, recent
studies have associated the RewP with individual difference in
IU (Nelson et al., 2016). Therefore, the RewP finding could be
regarded as supporting evidence that HTA individuals manifest
higher levels of IU than their LTA counterparts.
Third, the P3 component is supposed to index the
motivational significance of different options. Specifically, the P3
elicited by the immediate option was larger in the HTA group
than in the LTA group. In addition, the P3 elicited by the delayed
option was enhanced in the delayed decision condition for LTA
compared to HTA participants, indicating that LTA participants
had stronger motivations to select the delayed option. Taken
together, the P3 finding reveals that the motivation level of HTA
participants was more susceptible to the immediate option than
the delayed option, which may help to explain their behavioral
preference.
Finally, two limitations should be pointed out for an
appropriate interpretation of the current result. First, this study
only measured the level of trait anxiety in a healthy population.
Seeing that the healthy individuals with high anxiety and
the patients with anxiety disorders are qualitatively different
(Belzung and Griebel, 2001), the generalizability of the current
findings still await to be investigated in clinical populations.
Second, similar with previous studies (San Martín, 2012; Wu
et al., 2016), the temporal order of the immediate option and
the delayed option was fixed, so as to help participants to
reduce cognitive load and focus their attentions on decision-
related information. Seeing that the event sequence modulates
the characteristics of ERPs (e.g., the studies by Gu et al., 2011;
Osinsky et al., 2012), future studies should apply an alternative
temporal order to examine the robustness of our findings.
To sum up, this study has revealed that HTA participants
made more impulsive decisions in the delayed discounting
paradigm, which demonstrates a positive relationship between
trait anxiety and impulsive behavior. In addition, the ERP results
(including the N1, RewP, and P3) indicate that the psychological
processes of attentional orientation, encoding of reward values,
and motivational evaluation contribute to this phenomenon.
Specifically, HTA individuals’ preference for impulsive choices
is the consequence of an enhanced attentional orientation to
the immediate option, overvaluation of immediate rewards, and
higher level of motivations associated with immediacy.
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